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AbstrAct
Delegation of authority (DOA) is an essential procedure in every modern business. This chapter enu-
merates the requirements for a delegation of authority Web service that allows users and services to 
delegate to other users and services authority to access computer-based resources. The various models 
and architecture that can support a DOA Web service are described. A key component of the DOA service 
is the organisation’s delegation policy, which provides the rules for who is allowed to delegate what to 
whom, and which needs to be enforced by the DOA service. The essential elements of such a delegation 
policy are outlined. The chapter then describes a practical DOA Web service that has been built and 
piloted in various grid applications. It concludes by reviewing some related research and highlighting 
where future research is still required.
IntroductIon
Delegation of authority is an essential procedure 
in every modern business. A delegate is defined 
as “A person authorized to act as representative 
for another; a deputy or an agent” (www.diction-
ary.com). Without delegation of authority (DOA), 
managers would soon become overloaded. DOA 
allows tasks to be disseminated between employ-
ees in a controlled manner. A delegate may be 
appointed for months, day, or minutes, for one 
task, a series of tasks, or all tasks associated with 
a role. DOA needs to be fast and efficient with 
a minimum of disruption to others. Delegators 
should not need permission from their superiors 
for each act of delegation they undertake, or 
otherwise their superiors would soon become 
overburdened with delegation requests from 
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subordinates. Instead, a delegation policy should 
be in place so that delegators know when they are 
empowered to delegate (i.e., what and to whom) 
and when they are not. 
The recipient (or service provider) who is asked 
to perform a service for a delegate should be able 
to independently verify that the delegate has been 
properly authorized to act as a representative for 
the delegator, before granting the request. If the 
delegate has not been properly authorised, the 
delegate’s request should be declined. The recipi-
ent will therefore enforce the delegation policy of 
its organization and deny service requests from 
unauthorized delegates.
In a computing environment there is also a 
need for DOA. One computer process may need to 
delegate to another computer process. One person 
may need to delegate his privileges to another 
person in order to allow the later to undertake 
the computer-based tasks of the former. Similarly, 
in a service-oriented world, computer services 
also need the ability to delegate tasks to other 
services, so that the latter can perform subtasks 
on the former’s behalf. Service providers need 
to be able to verify that each service requestor is 
properly authorized. If the service requestor has 
been dynamically delegated authority by another 
authorized entity, service providers need to be 
able to verify that this was done in accordance 
with their delegation policy.
The objective of this chapter is to present a 
model for dynamic delegation of authority in a 
Web services world, in which users can delegate 
to other users, services to other services, and users 
to services. This chapter also describes a current 
implementation of this model and compares and 
contrasts it with other delegation systems that 
only partially implement the model.
bAckground
In Grid computing today, which is based on Web 
services, delegation from a user to his Grid job 
is enacted via the process of proxy certificates 
(Tuecke, Welch, Engert, Pearlman, & Thompson, 
2004). The purpose of these is two fold. Firstly, 
it allows a user to start a Grid job, and then leave 
it to run in his absence for as long as is required, 
without him needing to be there to continually 
log in and authorize the use of new Web services 
by the job. Secondly, it allows the job to migrate 
around the Grid, and to spawn new subtasks to 
run on other machines as necessary. These sub-
tasks can themselves authenticate as proxies of 
the user and consume Web services (or resources) 
that the user is entitled to have. The process 
works as follows. The Grid user, who must have 
an asymmetric key pair and X.509 certificate, 
initializes his Grid job, and during this process 
the job creates its own asymmetric key pair. The 
user then issues an X.509 proxy certificate for the 
Grid job, which certifies the public key of the job. 
The proxy certificate also contains the name of 
the job (which must be subordinate to the user’s 
own distinguished name), the name of the user as 
the issuer, and the signature of the user. The Grid 
job can now authenticate to any Web service Grid 
resource by digitally signing requests using its own 
newly created private key, and the Web service can 
authenticate the job using the job’s newly created 
proxy certificate. Because the name of the Grid 
job is subordinate to that of the user, then the Web 
service knows that it has to check if the user is 
authorized to access this service, and if so, then 
the service is to be consumed on behalf of the user. 
When a new subtask needs to be spawned, to run 
elsewhere on the Grid, the spawned subtask can 
generate its own new asymmetric key pair, and 
the original Grid job can issue a second proxy 
certificate for the spawned subtask, with a name 
that is subordinate to its own. In this way the job 
can delegate as necessary in order to achieve its 
aims. In each case, the Web service checks if the 
user, and not the job itself, is authorized to consume 
its resources. This is easily achieved because the 
name of the job is linked to the name of the user 
by being subordinate to it. 
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Note that in the basic proxy certificate scheme, 
determining the user’s authorization rights is left 
to the Web service. In Globus Toolkit, a grid map-
file is used to map the user’s authenticated (proxy 
certificate) name onto a local user account name, 
and the normal operating system mechanisms 
are then used to control the access rights of each 
user account. Proxy certificates do have a field 
(the Proxy Policy field) to contain authorization 
information, but no standard mechanisms are cur-
rently defined for what this field should contain, 
other than “inherit all” or “independent.” In the 
basic proxy scheme, the Proxy Policy field is set 
simply to “inherit all,” meaning that the proxy 
certificate inherits all the user’s access rights, 
whatever they are. The Proxy Policy field may 
alternatively be set to “independent,” meaning 
that the proxy should be treated as an independent 
entity that has its own authorization rights issued 
to it, and it inherits no rights of the issuing user, 
but we do not believe this latter value is currently 
being used much, if at all.
A slightly more sophisticated mechanism has 
recently been engineered in the Virtual Organiza-
tion Management Service (VOMS) (Alfieri, Cec-
chini, Ciaschini, Dell’agnello, Frohner, Lorentey, 
& Spataro, 2005). This allows a user to delegate 
an explicit subset of his roles to his grid job. The 
user asks his local VOMS server to issue him 
with one or more short lived X.509 attribute cer-
tificates (ACs) which contain (possibly a subset 
of) his roles in the virtual organization (VO). 
These attribute certificates are then placed inside 
the job’s proxy certificate (in a new certificate 
extension field—called AC Sequence—defined 
specifically for this) and in so doing, the ACs can 
be transported around the grid by the job and its 
spawned subtasks. The purpose of these ACs is 
to delegate to the job a specific (sub)set of roles 
held by the user, so that the job only inherits the 
(sub)set of permissions assigned to these roles. 
Note that VOMS does not use the Proxy Policy 
field for this, even though it was designed for this 
purpose. This is so that service providers which 
do not understand VOMS ACs and the new AC 
Sequence certificate extension field, can still 
utilize the proxy certificate in the basic way, by 
using the Proxy Policy field and assigning all the 
user’s permissions to the grid job. Whether this 
is good practice from a security perspective or 
not is open to debate.
As good as the proxy certificate scheme is, 
nevertheless there are a number of problems with 
its approach. Firstly, the delegator must have an 
asymmetric key pair in order to sign the proxy 
certificate. Most users today do not have X.509 
certificates and signing keys. Thus, we need a 
delegation process that does not mandate that a 
delegator has an asymmetric key pair. Secondly, 
proxy certificates cannot be revoked. Instead, 
they are designed to be relatively short lived. This 
means that once the Grid job has started, and its 
proxy certificate has been issued, it cannot be 
stopped automatically, and neither can any of the 
spawned sub tasks. Instead, some form of manual 
intervention by the Web service administrators 
will be needed to kill the job. To try to limit the 
damage, proxy certificates (and VOMS attribute 
certificates) are given short lifetimes, typically of 
the order of 24 hours, although the actual dura-
tion is application dependent. Ideally, we need a 
more proactive way of revoking proxy certificates 
after they have been issued and before they have 
expired, for example, by re-evaluating their per-
missions at specific intervals or every time new 
subtasks are spawned. Finally, the proxy certificate 
approach only works for DOA from a user to a Grid 
job and from a job to a spawned subtask, and does 
not work from user to user. This is a significant 
limitation in its applicability. In order to overcome 
all these limitations we need a better approach to 
DOA, one that is general purpose and can cater 
for delegation from person to person, person to 
task, task to task, service to service, and so forth, 
in which the delegators are not mandated to have 
PKI key pairs, and in which the act of delegation 
can be revoked prematurely.
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requIrements for Web 
servIces delegAtIon of 
AuthorIty
As stated above, the first requirement is for a 
general purpose delegation of authority service 
that can delegate from any type of entity to any 
other type of entity (Requirement 1).
Secondly, we need to be able to independently 
name the delegator and the delegate. It might be 
acceptable in person to job delegation that the job 
takes a name subordinate to that of the person, but 
in person to person delegation and Web service 
to Web service delegation we should not have 
to make the delegate assume a principal name 
which is subordinate to that of the delegator. For 
the reason of prudent accountability, if nothing 
more, every principal should authenticate with 
its own identity, and not with that of another. So 
delegation should be from one named entity to 
another, where their names do not need to bear 
any relationship to each other (Requirement 2).
In order to build a scalable authorization in-
frastructure, we need to move toward attribute or 
role-based access controls, where a principal is 
assigned one or more attributes, and the holder 
of a given set of attributes is given certain access 
rights to certain resources. In this way we can give 
access rights to a whole group of principals, for 
example, to anyone with an IEEE membership 
attribute, or to any member of project X, or any 
Web service of a specific type, without needing to 
list all the members individually, as there might 
be many thousands of them (Requirement 3).
The delegation scheme will benefit from a 
hierarchical model for roles and attributes so that 
delegators can delegate a subset of their roles/at-
tributes. With hierarchical roles and attributes, a 
principal with a superior role (or attribute) inherits 
all the permissions of the subordinate roles (or 
attributes), and may delegate a subordinate role 
rather than the most superior role he holds. For 
example, a project manager may be superior to 
a team leader who is superior to a team member 
who is superior to an employee. Principals should 
to be able to delegate any of their roles and attri-
butes to other principals, so that the delegate may 
perform on their behalf only those tasks that are 
enabled by the delegated attributes. For example, 
a project manager should be able to delegate the 
subordinate role of team member to an employee 
(Requirement 4).
All organizations need to be able to control the 
amount of delegation that is possible, in order to 
stop “wrong” delegations from being performed. 
For example, a project manager should not be able 
to delegate his age or name attributes to anyone 
else, nor be able to delegate the team member 
role to one of his children. So we need to have a 
Delegation Policy, and an effective enforcement 
mechanism that will control both the delegation 
process itself (is this delegator allowed to delegate 
these attributes to this delegate?) and the verifica-
tion process by the consuming Web service (is 
this delegate properly authorized to access this 
service?) (Requirement 5).
We may want very fine grained delegation, 
in order to delegate a specific task rather than 
attributes or roles, because the latter usually 
confer permissions to perform a set of tasks 
(Requirement 6).
Users must not be constrained to having a 
PKI key pair before they can delegate to another 
entity. Users should be able to authenticate and 
prove their identity without having to possess a 
public key certificate (Requirement 7).
A delegator should be able to prematurely re-
voke an act of delegation, without the delegation 
lasting for its originally intended period of time. 
When delegation takes place, its effect should 
be instantaneous. There are many reasons why 
premature revocation may be needed, for example, 
the delegator returns early from vacation or sick 
leave and wishes to continue in his role himself, 
or the delegate proves to be untrustworthy or 
incompetent in the delegated role, or the del-
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egate moves position in the organization and the 
delegation is no longer appropriate, and so forth 
(Requirement 8).
Finally, we may wish to make the whole 
DOA system Web services compliant, so that it 
will integrate nicely with the service-oriented 
architectures (SOA) Web services world that is 
the subject of this book. (Note, however, that this 
last requirement is not a functional requirement 
of DOA, because we can map the concepts and 
designs onto any underlying infrastructure, such 
as IPv6 protocols, CORBA, and so forth. Rather, 
it is an implementation requirement to facilitate 
integration with the Web services world.) (Re-
quirement 9).
The rest of this chapter is structured as fol-
lows. The next section describes the hierarchical 
role/attribute-based access control model, where 
principals are given any attributes rather than 
simply roles, and these attributes are used to gain 
access to resources which are identified by their 
attributes. The section after that describes a Web 
services-based architecture of a DOA infrastruc-
ture that will allow any principal to delegate any 
attribute to any other principal, providing it is in 
accordance with the organisation’s Delegation Pol-
icy. The following section describes the features 
that are needed in an organisation’s Delegation 
Policy in order to allow principals to delegate their 
attributes to other principals. The penultimate 
section describes one practical implementation 
of this DOA Web services infrastructure, and 
shows screen shots of a browser interface that al-
lows humans to delegate attributes to and revoke 
attributes from other humans. The final section 
concludes with a comparison of several other 
schemes and indicates where further research is 
still needed.
the hIerArchIcAl rbAc/AbAc 
model
Role-based access control (RBAC), our Require-
ment 3, was standardised by NIST and is now 
published as an American National Standard 
(ANSI, 2004). Figure 1 shows the ANSI RBAC 
model. Users are assigned roles via user assign-
Figure 1. The NIST/ANSI RBAC model
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ments (UAs). A user may be assigned zero, one, 
or more roles. A user with zero roles currently 
assigned will not be able to access any protected 
objects. 
A role may have zero, one, or more users as-
signed to it at any time, in order to cater for the 
natural migration of users between roles in an 
organisation. Roles are assigned permissions via 
Permission Assignments (PAs). A permission is 
the ability to perform an operation on a protected 
object or resource, for example, print to a laser-
jet printer, or invoke a Web service. A role may 
have zero, one, or more permissions assigned to 
it. A permission may also be assigned to a set of 
roles, for example, in order to read certain files 
of project X, the roles of employee and member 
of project X are needed. A user obtains the per-
mission to perform an operation on an object by 
being assigned the role or roles that has (have) the 
required permission(s) assigned to it (them). Users 
are statically constrained from having certain per-
missions by not being assigned the required roles. 
For example, in a bank the same person cannot 
usually audit transactions and be a teller, so static 
constraints will forbid the same user from being 
assigned both the teller and auditor roles.
In the ANSI RBAC model, roles may be 
organised in a hierarchy to suit the particular 
needs of an organisation. The reason for hav-
ing a hierarchy is that senior or superior roles 
inherit the permissions assigned to their junior 
or subordinate roles, so that the permissions do 
not need to be explicitly assigned to the senior 
role. This simplifies permission assignment and 
provides a solution for Requirement 4. For ex-
ample, say a project manager role is superior to 
a team leader role, and the team leader role has 
the permission sign off project task assigned to it. 
The project manager role automatically inherits 
this permission from the team leader role. Role 
hierarchies may be general hierarchies in which 
there is an arbitrary partial order between all 
the roles, or may be limited hierarchies in which 
some restrictions apply, for example, the hierarchy 
forms a tree structure or inverted tree structure. 
An organisation’s general role hierarchy can be a 
disjoint set of several hierarchies, in which there is 
no single most superior role or most subordinate 
role. This allows limited permission inheritance 
to propagate between the roles. 
By extending the ANSI RBAC model to in-
clude attributes of a user, such as age, name, and 
qualifications, in the role hierarchy, we can assign 
permissions to attributes as well as to roles, and 
migrate toward an attribute based access control 
(ABAC) model. Furthermore, by extending RBAC 
so that permissions can refer to operations on 
classes of objects identified by their attributes 
instead of operations on specifically named ob-
jects, we extend the migration to ABAC. Also by 
supporting resource class hierarchies, in which 
subordinate resource object classes inherit the 
attributes of their superior more generic object 
classes, we allow permission assignments to 
be inherited by subordinate object classes. For 
example, a permission assignment that says that 
users with the employee role can print on print-
ers, through the process of role and resource 
object class inheritance we simultaneously allow 
managers (who are superior to employees) to 
print on laser jet printers (which are subordinate 
to printers).
In order to cater for dynamic constraints, in 
which a conflict of interest might arise if a user 
acts in multiple roles simultaneously, but not if 
a user acts in the roles independently, the con-
cept of sessions is introduced. For example, say 
the traveller role is allowed to complete travel 
expenses claim forms and the manager role is 
allowed to authorise completed forms. People who 
are managers are usually travellers as well, but 
obviously managers are not allowed to authorise 
their own completed travel claim forms. Thus, a 
user cannot simultaneously act as a traveller and a 
manager in a session in order to complete a travel 
claim form and then authorise the completed 
form. When a user wishes to use the system he 
must activate one or more of his roles in a session, 
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and the dynamic constraint will not allow him to 
activate conflicting roles in the same session. In 
the case of the travel claim request scenario, the 
user session starts when the travel claim form is 
opened and finishes when the user has finished 
accessing it.
Applying AbAc to distributed Web 
services
The ANSI RBAC standard says nothing about 
how roles are assigned to users or permissions 
are assigned to roles. In this chapter, we assume 
that each role and attribute has an administrative 
authority that controls the assignment of roles and 
attributes to users. We further assume that in a 
distributed environment there will be many such 
attribute authorities (AAs) that reside in different 
domains from each other and from the Web service 
that is being accessed. Consequently, it must be 
the Web service provider itself that decides who 
are the attribute authorities that it trusts to assign 
which roles and attributes to which users, and 
furthermore, what permissions to confer on each 
attribute and role. In this way, each Web service 
remains autonomous and in direct control of who 
is authorised to access its resources.
Roles (or attributes) are assigned to users in 
the form of attribute assertions, or attribute cer-
tificates (ACs), in which an issuer (an AA) asserts 
that a holder has a particular attribute. An AC is 
a digitally signed or “certified” attribute asser-
tion. Each attribute assertion should contain: the 
name (or identity) of the holder, the attributes that 
have been assigned to the holder by the issuer, the 
name (or identity) of the issuer that is, the AA, 
and the period of time the assertion is valid. At-
tribute assertions may also optionally contain the 
policy rules of the issuer, for example, limiting the 
resources that the assertion may be presented to. 
The assertion may be digitally signed by the issuer 
to prove or certify that the contents are authentic. 
In a distributed environment the digital signature 
will always be necessary, unless a trusted path 
exists between the issuer and the consuming Web 
service. Examples of ACs are: a degree certificate 
issued to a graduate by a university, a state reg-
istered nurse certificate issued to a nurse by the 
Royal College of Nursing, an employee certificate 
issued to a member of staff by the employing 
organisation, and a project manager certificate 
issued to a person by a VO manager. 
There are two standard formats for attribute as-
sertions, or ACs. The first is the ISO/ITU-T X.509 
Attribute Certificate format (ITU-T, 2005), and 
the second is the OASIS SAML attribute assertion 
format (OASIS, 2005). The primary difference 
between the two formats is that the former is a 
binary encoding of the assertion, while the latter 
is an XML text encoding; furthermore, the digital 
signature is mandatory in the X.509 AC format, 
and optional in the SAML attribute assertion 
format. Both formats are infinitely extensible to 
allow for bespoke tailoring by applications and 
issuers, for example, to add application specific 
policy rules. Both of these token formats can be 
used as authorisation credentials by users, and 
a Web services infrastructure should be able to 
cater for both of these formats as a minimum. If 
a user presents an X.509 AC or SAML attribute 
assertion to a Web service, the service should be 
able to determine from the attribute authorities 
that it trusts if the user has sufficient attributes (or 
roles) to be granted access to its resources.
A Web servIces-bAsed 
delegAtIon of AuthorIty 
ArchItecture
The ISO Standard 10181-3 (ITU-T, 1995) provides 
a general architectural model for controlling ac-
cess to networked resources (see Figure 2). In this 
model, the access control enforcement function 
(AEF) or policy enforcement point (PEP)—the 
terms are synonymous—intercepts an initiator’s 
access request and asks the application independ-
ent access control decision function (ADF) or 
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policy decision point (PDP)—again the terms are 
synonymous—if the initiator is allowed to perform 
the requested action on the target resource. The 
PDP examines the authorisation credentials of 
the initiator and consults its policy—which can 
be an ABAC or RBAC policy—to determine if 
the initiator has sufficient attributes (or roles) to 
be granted access to the target resource. From 
this evaluation it returns a granted or denied 
response to the PEP. The initiator’s credentials 
may be provided by either the initiator in its ac-
cess request, or the PDP can retrieve them itself 
from the issuer or a credential repository.
The architectural model (Figure 2) is ideal 
for controlling access to Web services. The Web 
service endpoint reference is the PEP that traps the 
user’s service request. It then forwards the user’s 
request to the PDP asking for an authorisation 
decision. The PEP and PDP can be collocated, 
or distributed, and communicate via an open 
protocol such as in Welch, Ananthakrishnan, 
Siebenlist, Chadwick, Meder, and Pearlman 
(2006). If the PDP returns granted, the user is 
allowed to consume the resources of the Web 
service, but if the PDP returns denied, the user’s 
request will be rejected by the PEP. The complex 
task of deciding if the user has the correct set of 
attributes for the requested service is handed over 
to the application independent PDP to determine. 
It is the PDP that will decide if the user has been 
properly assigned or delegated the attributes that 
are asserted in the user’s credentials according 
to the authorisation policy that is written by the 
Web service administrator.
Interestingly, we can also utilise the above 
model when creating a delegation of authority 
(DOA) Web service (see Figure 3). The DOA Web 
service will receive a delegation request from a 
delegator to delegate an attribute or attributes to 
a delegate. The delegator can be any Web ser-
Figure 2. X.812/ISO 10181-3 access control framework
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vice, or a human being acting via a Web services 
user interface. The delegate can be another Web 
service or another human being. In this way, we 
achieve the desired objective of person to person, 
service to service, person to service, and service 
to person delegation of authority (Requirement 1). 
The target resource is the Web service software 
that is able to issue an authorisation credential, 
in the form of an AC, for the delegate, on behalf 
of the delegator. This issue AC software should 
be capable of creating the attribute certificate in 
either X.509 AC or signed SAML attribute asser-
tion format. This issue AC software should have 
its own digital signing key pair for this task, so 
that future credential recipients can verify that the 
issued credential is authentic. Because most users 
do not have their own PKI key pairs, they cannot 
issue their own ACs. This is why we require the 
DOA Web service to sign the credential on the 
delegator’s behalf. This solves Requirement 7. 
The delegator’s request will be intercepted 
by the PEP, and passed to the PDP to ask if this 
user is allowed to delegate this/these particular 
attribute(s) to this delegate, according to the 
organisation’s delegation policy (Requirement 5). 
The PDP retrieves the delegator’s current set of 
authorisation credentials or roles/attributes from 
the local repository, and consults the delegation 
policy to see if the requested delegation is allowed 
or not. If the policy allows the delegator and del-
egate to be independently named, then this solves 
Requirement 2. As a result of evaluating the policy, 
the PDP replies granted or denied to the PEP. If 
granted, the PEP will ask the Issue AC software 
Figure 3. The delegation of authority Web service architecture
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to issue a delegated authorisation credential to 
the delegate on behalf of the delegator, and will 
then either publish this in the local credential 
repository or return it to the requestor, or both. 
The delegate will now be able to use the issued 
credential to gain access to the service that has 
been delegated to him, and may also be able to 
further delegate the embedded attribute to other 
delegates, if allowed by the delegation policy. If the 
local repository stores delegated attributes instead 
of credentials, the Issue AC software will still 
create the delegated attribute(s) for the delegate, 
but not sign them, and the delegated attribute(s) 
will be stored in the repository. Subsequently, 
the delegate will be able to ask the DOA Web 
service to issue a new credential for him, based 
on the attributes that are stored for him in the 
local repository.
When a delegator makes a Delegate Attribute 
request to the DOA Web service, the delegator is 
first authenticated to determine who he or she is. 
Delegator authentication can be by any suitable 
means, and can be via an internal authentication 
service or external Web service. This model does 
not dictate any particular authentication scheme 
(Requirement 7). It is up to an implementation 
to determine the most appropriate authentica-
tion mechanism to use. That being said, digital 
signatures would be the most appropriate and 
secure mechanism for Web service to Web service 
authentication, but for authenticating a human 
user that is accessing the DOA Web service via 
a Web services user interface, a username and 
password stored in the local LDAP directory 
might be appropriate.
The next step is to optionally map the request-
or’s authenticated name into the authorisation 
name that is held in the authorisation credentials. 
This step is only needed if the two names are differ-
ent, for example, when proxying is used (this will 
be described in more detail in the Implementation 
Section) or when the authentication mechanism 
uses a different name form to that stored in the 
issued credentials. Ideally this step should not 
be needed in the latter case, because the authen-
ticated name should be held in the authorisation 
credential. If the mapping is needed, how this is 
performed is not part of the model, but care will 
be needed because a security vulnerability will 
be introduced if the mapping is not made in a 
secure manner.
Once the PEP has the delegator’s authorisation 
name, it asks the PDP if this user is allowed to 
delegate this/these particular attribute(s) to the 
delegate. If granted is returned, the PEP then 
asks the target resource (Issue AC) to issue the 
new authorisation credential to the delegate, on 
behalf of the delegator. It then publishes the new 
credential in the repository or returns it to the 
requestor. If the delegate wishes to further delegate 
this credential to someone else, then the delegate 
will now take on the role of delegator and access 
the DOA Web service to request delegation of 
this/these attribute(s) to someone else. In this way, 
delegation can continue automatically from one 
user to another, providing, of course, that each 
delegation is in accordance with the organisation’s 
delegation policy.
The model supports two different modes of 
operation, depending upon whether the repository 
stores credentials or attributes/roles. In both cases, 
delegation only takes places once, but credential 
issuing may take place zero, one, or more times. 
When the repository stores credentials, they are 
only issued once by the DOA Web service, they 
will typically have a relatively long lifetime (the 
period of the delegation), and they can be retrieved 
at will from the repository by users or by Web 
services that wish to validate the authority of a 
user to access its service. When the repository 
stores attributes/roles, the DOA Web service 
can be called repeatedly to issue typically short 
lived credentials based on the attributes/roles that 
have been delegated and stored in the repository. 
When the DOA Web service is only issuing al-
ready delegated attributes, the delegator’s name 
is not required, only the name of the delegate. 
In both modes of operation the repository will 
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need to record the validity period of the delega-
tion and any policy conditions that are attached 
to it. If credentials are stored, this information is 
embedded in the issued credentials, if attributes 
are stored, separate fields will be needed in the 
repository to record it. When the repository stores 
attributes, it has to be strongly secured to pre-
vent tampering with its contents and an attacker 
inserting false attributes. When the repository 
stores credentials, because the latter are digitally 
signed, it is not possible for an attacker to insert 
false credentials into the repository without first 
gaining access to the private signing key of the 
Issue AC service. Even if the repository is only 
weakly protected, the worst an attacker could do 
would be to remove a user’s credentials, a denial 
of service attack.
the Advantages of a doA Web 
service
Here, we summarise the benefits of using a DOA 
Web service instead of each delegator issuing their 
own delegated credentials. Firstly, the DOA Web 
service can support a fully secure audit trail and 
a repository, so that there is an easily accessible 
record of every authorization credential/attribute 
that has been issued and revoked throughout the 
organization. If each delegator were allowed to 
independently issue their own credentials, then 
this information would be distributed throughout 
the organization, making it difficult or impossible 
to collect, being possibly badly or never recorded 
or even lost. 
Secondly, the DOA Web service can be pro-
vided with the organization’s delegation policy, 
and apply control procedures to ensure that a 
delegator does not overstep her authority by is-
suing greater permissions to delegates, or even 
to herself, than the organization’s policy allows. 
For example, a delegator may have an attribute 
that they are allowed to delegate to others, but 
not allowed to assert themselves. Without proper 
controls a delegator may delegate the attribute to 
himself so that he is then allowed to assert the 
attribute. A well constructed delegation policy 
and PDP enforcement mechanism can ensure that 
this does not happen. 
Thirdly, we don’t get cascading revocations. 
In a traditional certificate chain, such as a PKI 
certificate chain, if any superior certificate in the 
chain is revoked, then all the subordinate certifi-
cates are also automatically revoked. Thus, if a 
delegator issued her own ACs, and her delegates 
then issued their own ACs, then if her AC was 
subsequently revoked, then all the delegates’ ACs 
would also become immediately invalid. We typi-
cally don’t want this to happen in an organization. 
For example, if a manager delegates various roles 
to members of staff in her department, and is then 
replaced and her role is revoked, we don’t want 
all the delegated roles to be immediately revoked 
as well, or the department might grind to a halt. 
This does not happen with a DOA Web service. 
Because all the ACs are issued and signed by the 
DOA Web service, then a delegator’s AC can be 
revoked without causing any of the delegate’s ACs 
to be automatically revoked. Note however, if we 
record the name of the delegator in each issued 
AC, we are still able to implement cascading 
revocations if we require them.
Fourthly, the complexity of AC chain valida-
tion is significantly simplified. When delegators 
issue the ACs themselves, the AC chains can be-
come arbitrarily long. When the DOA Web service 
issues the ACs to delegates, the AC chain length 
will always be a maximum of two, depending upon 
who the relying party trusts. If the relying party 
trusts the administrative authority that operates 
the DOA Web service and the former has delegated 
the issuing of ACs to the latter, then the chain 
length will always be two (trusted authority)  
(AC of DOA Web service)  (AC of delegate). If 
the relying party trusts the DOA Web service as 
a root of trust, then AC chain lengths are reduced 
to just one, the AC of the delegate issued by the 
trusted DOA Web service.
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Finally, a delegator does not need to hold and 
maintain her own private signing key, which 
would be needed if the delegator were to issue and 
sign her own ACs. Only the DOA Web service 
(the Issue AC component) needs to have an AC 
signing key.
The only disadvantage of using a DOA Web 
service is that the AC signing key must be per-
manently online and ready to be used to sign ACs 
when requested. In some highly secure systems 
and applications, this will be unacceptable.
revocation of Authority
There are several different approaches that have 
been taken to the complex issue of revocation of 
authority, and of informing remote relying parties 
when revocation has taken place. Relying parties 
in our context refers to Web service providers who 
consume the issued credentials. The primary ob-
jective of revocation is to remove a credential (and 
all its copies, if any) from circulation as quickly 
as possible, so that relying parties are no longer 
able to use it. If this is not possible, a secondary 
objective is to inform the relying parties that an 
existing credential in circulation has been revoked 
and should not be used or trusted. The latter can 
be achieved by requiring either the relying parties 
to periodically check with the credential issuer, 
or the credential issuer to periodically notify the 
relying parties. Of these, requiring the relying 
parties to periodically check with the credential 
issuer is preferred, because it places the onus on 
the relying parties rather than on the issuer, be-
cause in general an issuer may not know who all 
the relying parties are, but the latter will always 
know who the issuer is.
The simplest approach, that used by X.509 
proxy certificates (Tuecke et al., 2004), VOMS 
ACs (Alfieri et al., 2005), and SAML attribute 
assertions (OASIS, 2005), is to never revoke a 
credential, and instead to issue short lived delega-
tion/ authorisation credentials that will expire after 
a short period of time and thus be effectively and 
automatically removed from circulation within a 
fixed period. The assumption in this case is that 
it is unlikely that authorisations will need to be 
revoked immediately after they have been issued 
and before they have expired. Because they are 
only valid for a short period of time, the opportu-
nity to inflict damage through the illegitimate use 
of the authorisation credentials is short lived. Of 
course, the amount of damage that can be done in 
a short period of time can be huge, so short lived 
credentials are not always the best solution. Con-
sequently, SAML attribute assertions also have 
the optional feature of containing a “one time use” 
element, which means that the consuming Web 
service can only use the attribute assertion once 
to grant access, and then it should never be used 
again. Instead, a new attribute assertion should 
be obtained from the attribute authority each time 
the user requests access to the Web service. This 
feature could be used in our DOA architecture, 
either at delegation time, in which case it would 
allow a delegator to delegate an attribute for one 
time use only by the delegate, or at issuing time 
(if attributes are stored in the repository) in which 
case the short lived ACs would be flagged for 
one time use. 
An advantage of short lived credentials is that 
they effectively remove a credential from circula-
tion after a short period of time, and consequently 
they mandate that users or service providers must 
frequently contact the credential issuer in order 
to obtain new freshly minted credentials.
The main disadvantage of short lived cre-
dentials is knowing how long to issue them for. 
They should be valid for the maximum time that 
anyone is likely to need them for, or otherwise 
one of the later steps of a user’s task may fail to 
be authorised before the task has been completed, 
which could lead to the task being aborted and all 
the processing lost. This is a current well-known 
problem with proxy certificates. On the other hand, 
the longer they are valid, the greater their period 
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of vulnerability to misuse without any direct way 
of withdrawing them from circulation. This has 
caused some researchers to suggest that proxy 
certificates should be revocable!
A second disadvantage of short lived creden-
tials is that the bulk of the effort is placed on the 
issuer, who has to keep reissuing the short lived 
credentials. This could become a bottleneck to 
performance. A better solution should put the bulk 
of the processing effort onto the relying parties, 
because these are the ones who want to use the 
issued credentials.
A different approach to achieving the second-
ary objective of revocation is to notify the relying 
parties when revocation has taken place by issuing 
revocation lists. A revocation list is a digitally 
signed list of revoked credentials, usually signed 
by the same authority that issued the original 
credentials. Revocation lists have an expiry time 
and are updated and issued periodically. Relying 
parties are urged to obtain the next issue of the 
revocation list before the current one has expired, 
in order to keep as up to date as possible. The lat-
est revocation list can be sent by the user along 
with his credentials, to prove that his credentials 
have not been revoked, or the relying party can 
independently download them from the issuer’s 
repository. The use of certificate revocation lists 
(CRLs) is the approach standardised in X.509 
(ITU-T, 2005) and is most frequently used by 
X.509 public key infrastructures. Revocation 
lists ensure that relying parties are eventually 
informed when a credential has been revoked, no 
matter how many copies of the credential there 
are in circulation, but revocation lists have several 
big disadvantages. Firstly, there is always some 
delay between a user’s credential being revoked 
and the next issue of the revocation list appearing. 
This could be 24 hours or even longer, depending 
upon the frequency of issue of the CRLs. Thus, 
in order to reduce risk to a minimum, a relying 
party would always need to delay authorising 
a user’s request until it had obtained the latest 
CRL that was published after the user issued his 
service request, which of course is impractical for 
most scenarios. If the relying party relies on the 
current revocation list, then the risk from using 
a revoked credential equates, on average, to half 
that of using a short lived credential, assuming 
the validity period of a short lived credential is 
equal to the period between successively issued 
CRLs. This reduced risk comes at an increased 
processing cost.
CRLs can put a significant processing load on 
both the issuer and the relying party. CRLs have to 
be issued at least once every time period, regard-
less of whether any credentials have been revoked 
or not during that period. In a large system the 
lists can get inordinately long containing many 
thousands of revoked credentials. These have to 
be reissued every time period, distributed over 
the network, and read in and processed by the 
relying parties. Delta revocation lists (ITU-T, 
2005) have alleviated this problem, but again by 
increased processing complexity. Consequently, 
few people, if any, today are using revocation lists 
with authorisation credentials.
An alternative approach to notifying relying 
parties is to use the online certificate status proto-
col (OCSP) (Myers, Ankney, Malpani, Galperin, 
& Adams, 1999). Rather than a relying party peri-
odically retrieving the latest revocation list from 
the issuer’s repository, the OCSP allows a relying 
party to ask an OCSP responder in real time if a 
certificate (i.e., credential) is still valid or not. The 
response indicates if the certificate is good, or has 
been revoked, or its status is unknown. Because 
most OCSP responders base their service on the 
latest published revocation lists, the revocation 
status information is no more current than if the 
relying party had consulted the latest revocation 
list itself; thus the risk is not lessened. But what 
an OCSP responder does do is reduce the amount 
of processing that a relying party has to undertake 
in order to validate a user’s credential/certificate. 
This reduced cost to the relying parties is offset 
by the cost of setting up and running the OCSP 
service.
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We can see that none of the above approaches 
to revocation is ideal. Delegation of authority 
might last for a long period of time, especially 
when humans delegate roles that are meant to last 
for months or even years. We could issue long 
lived credentials, but the use of CRLs for revo-
cation has many disadvantages. We could issue 
short lived credentials, but there is an inherent 
conflict between long lived delegation and short 
lived credentials that needs to be resolved. In the 
proposed architectural model this can be resolved 
by storing delegated attributes in the repository, 
along with the validity period of the delegation, 
and then repeatedly issuing short lived credentials 
as and when they are required until the delega-
tion period has expired. Early revocation of the 
delegation is then achieved by removing the user’s 
attributes from the repository. This approach is 
viable, but we are still left with the problem of 
determining the validity period of the short lived 
credentials.
Consequently, we propose an alternative 
scheme that we believe is superior to short lived 
credentials, CRLs, and OCSP servers. We believe 
that the optimum approach to credential issuing 
should have the following features. A user’s cre-
dential should be issued just once and stored in 
the issuer’s repository with its own unique URL. 
The credential should be valid for as long as the 
delegation is required, which can be a relatively 
long or short period of time. This minimises the 
effort of the credential issuer (and the delegator). 
A credential should be able to be used many times 
by many different service providers, according to 
the user’s wishes, without having to be reissued. 
This mirrors the situation today with our plastic 
credit cards and other similar types of credential. 
A credential should be capable of being revoked 
at any time, and the revocation should be instant. 
This can be achieved by the issuer simply deleting 
the credential from its repository and requiring 
relying parties to contact the issuer’s repository 
periodically, using the URL of the credential, 
to check if the credential is still present or has 
been revoked. This period can be determined by 
the relying party according to its risk mitigation 
strategy. This period can vary per application or 
per user request, and is set by the relying party 
as appropriate, and not by the issuer, which is 
putting the responsibility where it belongs. Ide-
ally, a relying party should contact the repository 
when the credential is first used, and then periodi-
cally during the life of the authorisation session 
according to its own risk assessment. In order to 
strongly bind the repository to the credential, the 
credential’s URL is embedded in the credential, 
so that the relying party knows where to go to 
check for the revocation status of the credential. 
This design minimises the processing effort of the 
issuers and the relying parties, because issuers do 
not need to continually mint new credentials, and 
relying parties do not need to process potentially 
large revocation lists. A secure network lookup, 
for example using TLS (Dierks & Allen, 1999) to 
bind to the repository URL, is all that is needed 
to ensure that a credential is still valid and has 
not been revoked. A simple bitwise comparison of 
the initial validated credential with subsequently 
retrieved copies is all that is needed to ensure that 
the credential is still the same one. Finally, there is 
little possibility of the credential expiring before 
the user’s task has been completed, because it is 
likely to be long lived, which is not the case with 
short lived nonrevocable credentials.
the delegAtIon PolIcy
In essence, the delegation policy needs to say 
who (i.e., the delegator) is entitled to delegate 
what (i.e., which roles and attributes and if 
fine grained delegation is also required, which 
tasks or permissions as well) to whom (i.e., 
the delegate), and under what constraints. The 
process of delegation forms a directed acyclic 
graph (DAG), with the initial attribute holders 
that is, initial delegators, as the sources of the 
graph (see Figure 4). Intermediate nodes in the 
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graph represent delegates who subsequently act 
as delegators and further delegate their attributes 
(or permissions) to others. Sink nodes represent 
delegates who have not further delegated their 
attributes (or permissions) to others. Edges in 
the graph represent the attributes or permissions 
that have been delegated from the delegator to the 
delegate. Successor edges must always represent 
the same or less attributes and permissions than 
the union of their predecessor edges; otherwise 
a delegator will have delegated more privileges 
than he himself possessed. The graph is acyclic 
because a delegator should not be able to delegate 
to herself or to a predecessor (e.g., edges 14 and 
17 in Figure 4). Rationally, there is a reason for 
this; a delegate should never need to delegate to 
an entity that previously delegated directly or 
indirectly to it. But there is also a security reason 
for this. There is a potential security loophole if a 
delegator, who is allowed to delegate a privilege 
but not to assert it, does subsequently delegate it 
to herself, as then she would be able to assert the 
delegated privilege (see later). 
The delegation policy specifies the schema for 
this directed acyclic graph, thereby controlling 
which entities can be sources, sinks, and interme-
diate nodes, and what the attribute relationships 
between the nodes are. 
A simplified form of the directed graph is a 
delegation tree, in which there is only one source 
or root node which holds all the attributes that can 
be delegated, and each act of delegation creates a 
separate delegate subordinate node. If a delegate 
receives attributes from two or more delegators in 
separate acts of delegation, such as edges 7 and 12 
in Figure 4, then these are represented as separate 
edges and nodes in the tree, without merging the 
delegate nodes together. The purpose of this is 
Figure 4. An example delegation directed acyclic graph
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to forbid such a delegate from combining their 
various attributes together and delegating them 
to another delegate in a single act of delegation, 
such as in edges 8, 10, or 11 of Figure 4. Instead, 
multiple separate acts of delegation must take 
place, thereby maintaining the tree structure. 
The reason for this is that subsequent delegation 
and revocation become cleaner and easier to 
determine. In the case of delegation it is easier 
to prevent cycles from occurring. For example, 
in Figure 4, should the delegation from David 
to Fred take place in edge 17? The answer is no 
if it contains attributes from edges 6 or 4, but 
yes if it only contains attributes from edge 12. 
Consequently, determining which delegation is 
allowed and which is not can be quite complex in 
a DAG, but it is much easier in a tree. The process 
of revocation is to remove a delegation edge from 
the DAG and any consequential edges dependent 
upon the revoked edge. When delegation forms a 
tree, revoking an edge simply removes the whole 
subtree in a single act of revocation. With a DAG, 
there may be multiple incoming edges to a del-
egate node (from the same or different delegator 
nodes, as in edges 4 and 6 to Joe or 7 and 12 to 
David, respectively), and multiple outgoing edges 
to further delegates. If one of the incoming edges 
is revoked, the process of determining which 
outgoing edges and further delegate nodes should 
be deleted and which should remain becomes 
much more complicated. Thus, delegation trees 
significantly simplify delegation DAGs.
Concerning what can be delegated from a 
delegator to a delegate, this can be determined 
by reference to the role hierarchy. A delegator 
should be allowed to delegate any of the roles or 
attributes that he possesses or any of their junior 
roles from the role hierarchy. We have already 
described the role hierarchy in the fourth sec-
tion, which specifies the partial order relationship 
Figure 5. Combining permissions with the role hierarchy to determine what can be delegated
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between the attributes and roles, but we can also 
add the permissions that each role or attribute has 
been granted into this hierarchy as well, making 
them the leaves of the delegation role hierarchy 
(see Figure 5). In this way the holder of an at-
tribute (represented by a large circle in Figure 5) 
can delegate this particular attribute or any of its 
subordinate attributes from the role hierarchy or 
any of their associated permissions (represented 
by small circles in Figure 5), to a delegate in the 
DAG or delegation tree. For example, referring 
to Figure 5, a person holding the project manager 
role should be able to delegate this role, or any 
of its subordinate roles, for example, Quality 
Engineer, or any of the associated permissions, 
for example, Update Project Plans, to a delegate. 
This gives the delegator fine grained control 
over what he is able to delegate (Requirement 
6). In the delegation DAG, a successor edge in 
the delegation graph must contain the same or 
less attributes/permissions than the union of its 
predecessor edges, with reference to the role and 
permissions hierarchy.
Note, however, that there is one significant 
difference between the roles and the permissions 
in Figure 5. The roles are assigned by the attribute 
authorities in one domain, while the permissions 
are assigned to the roles by the service provid-
ers in possibly different domains. Furthermore, 
different service providers may assign different 
permissions to the same role/attribute. For ex-
ample, you might posses an American Express 
credit card, and find that it is not valid in one shop, 
is valid for any purchases in another shop, and is 
only valid for purchases over £5 in a third shop. 
The attribute has not changed, but the permission 
assigned to it has, according to the policy of the 
service provider. Thus, in order to achieve fine 
grained authorisation at the permission level, 
the attribute authority will need to closely liaise 
with the various service providers in order to add 
these permissions to its delegation role hierarchy. 
Note that we can achieve the same fine grained 
control over delegation if we create new uni-per-
mission roles as the leaves of the role hierarchy, 
where each new uni-permission role is assigned 
just one of the permissions of the superior “real” 
role, for example, we can create an AccessPrinter 
role subordinate to the Employee role in Figure 
5 to replace the Access Printer permission. This 
uni-permission role will not be assigned to a per-
son initially, but it may be delegated to another 
entity dynamically. However, for this dynamic 
fine grained delegation of authority to work in a 
Web services world, the service provider that has 
assigned the permission to the role, for example, 
Access Printer to the Employee role, will now need 
to update its access control policy and add the new 
uni-permission role, for example, AccessPrinter 
to its role hierarchy. Service providers may be 
reluctant to make these changes to their RBAC 
policies, in which case permissions instead of 
uni-permission roles will need to be delegated.
There are additional policy rules that may need 
to be included in the delegation policy, such as: 
is a delegate allowed to delegate the credential 
again, that is, is the delegation process recursive 
or not, and if it is recursive, how many times 
can the delegation recurse, an infinite number 
of times or a limited number of times? We also 
need to consider if a delegator is empowered to 
assert the attributes and tasks that he is delegat-
ing, or is only allowed to delegate them, and if 
an attribute can be asserted, is there a control on 
where it can be asserted, that is, with only a subset 
of service providers? Consider, for example, an 
airline manager who is assigning a duty roster to 
pilots. The manager is delegating permission to 
fly an aircraft (say the “on flight duty” attribute) 
during certain periods of the day to pilots (the 
delegates). Clearly, the manager should not be able 
to invoke this permission himself, and empower 
himself to fly one of the aircraft, and thus the role 
(or task) may be delegated but not asserted by the 
airline manager. (Note that there is an alternative 
way of modeling this, by requiring a person who 
is authorised to fly an aircraft to have two attri-
butes, say “on flight duty” and “qualified pilot,” 
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and to only give the airline manager permission 
to delegate the “on flight duty” attribute. Then, 
the airline manager would only be able to fly the 
aircraft if he was a qualified pilot. But in order 
to make our model flexible enough, we see that 
it is an advantage to have an assertion flag in 
our delegation policy.) A delegation policy may 
also contain conditions that a candidate delegate 
must fulfil before delegation can take place. For 
example, before a person can be delegated the 
fire officer role they must first have obtained a 
first aid certificate. Many of these conditions 
can be expressed in terms of attributes or roles a 
candidate delegate must possess before the new 
attribute or role can be delegated to them.
A flexible delegation policy language will al-
low the policy writer to specify the delegators and 
delegates by their attributes or roles, as well by 
specifically naming them. For example, we should 
be able to say “heads of department may delegate 
the fire officer role to members of staff within their 
department” as well as “Joe can delegate the fire 
officer role to David.” The former allows whole 
groups of users to be delegators and delegates, the 
latter only allows specifically named individuals. 
In order for a person to delegate the fire officer role 
under the first policy rule, this person must have 
been assigned the assertable head of department 
role and the assertable or nonassertable fire officer 
role (depending upon whether he can act as a fire 
officer himself or only delegate this role) and the 
delegate must have been assigned the member of 
staff role and have the same department attribute 
as the delegator. In order for the latter policy rule 
to take effect, user Joe only needs to have been 
assigned the fire officer role and user David needs 
to exist. Note that the first policy rule on its own 
does not constitute a complete delegation policy. 
In order to be complete, a delegation policy must 
always specify which users are the delegation 
sources of authority in the DAG, that is, named 
individuals or services, and what attributes they 
are allowed to assign to whom. Otherwise, the 
PDP will not be able to determine if a particular 
delegation is allowed or not. For example, if we 
only have the former policy rule, and Joe attempts 
to delegate the fire officer role to Fred, then the 
PDP will not know if Joe is a head of department 
or not, or who is allowed to say that Joe is a head 
of department and who is allowed to say that Fred 
is a member of staff. If we only have the latter 
policy rule, the PDP will not know who is allowed 
to say that Joe is a fire officer. Without additional 
policy rules the PDP will not be able to determine 
if the delegator or possibly the delegate are bona-
fide. Thus, delegation source of authority (SoA) 
policy rules are needed. These SoA rules may 
be completely general, and say, for example, that 
Person X is the trusted source of authority who 
may issue any credentials to anyone containing 
any attributes or permissions, or they may be much 
more specific and say, for example, that Person 
X is trusted to assign the head of department 
attribute to anyone in the organisation, but may 
not assert this attribute himself. With these SoA 
rules in the place the PDP is then able to make 
authorisation decisions.
To summarise, a delegation policy needs to 
be able to:
1. Specify the delegation process in terms 
of a delegation directed acyclic graph (or 
a simplified delegation tree). This is done 
by specifying the rules for the delegation 
relationships that can exist between pairs 
of nodes in the DAG.
2. Identify the delegator and delegate nodes 
in the DAG by their attributes or roles or 
unique names/identifiers.
3. Specify trusted sources of authority of the 
DAG by their unique names/identifiers.
4. Specify what can be delegated in terms of 
an attribute/role hierarchy.
5. For very fine grained delegation optionally 
include the various attribute permissions 
as the leaf nodes in the attribute/role hier-
archy.
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6. Specify whether delegator nodes in the DAG 
can or cannot assert the attributes that they 
are allowed to delegate.
7. Control the depth of the delegation graph 
(length of delegation chains).
8. Optionally specify other policy rules that 
can control when, where, or how delegates 
may assert the privileges that have been 
delegated to them.
9. Optionally place conditions on candidate 
delegates that must be fulfilled before del-
egation can take place.
ImPlementIng A PrActIcAl doA 
Web servIce
One can see that building a dynamic DOA Web 
service is reasonably complex and many compet-
ing choices have to be made. Primary choices 
are: should the DOA Web service repository 
store attributes or credentials? Should the issued 
credentials be short lived or long lived? If long 
lived, then how should revocation be performed? 
As stated in the fifth section, there are two main 
modes of operation that can be envisaged for the 
DOA Web service. 
In the first mode of operation, the repository 
is an internally trusted component of the system 
and stores attributes rather than credentials. It is 
assumed that the repository cannot be tampered 
with by attackers, and therefore the attributes 
within it are safe. The DOA Web service issues 
short lived credentials to clients on demand. Con-
sequently, no revocation is necessary. Users can 
delegate their attributes to other users according 
to the delegation policy. Clients can make repeated 
requests to the service for short lived credentials 
to be issued to users based on the attributes held 
by the users. 
Figure 6. A practical delegation of authority Web service
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In the second mode of operation, the repository 
is accessible to the outside world in read mode 
via secure links and stores relatively long lived 
credentials which are tamperproof. Users delegate 
these credentials to other users, and the DOA Web 
service has write access to the repository. Clients 
retrieve the credentials by contacting the reposi-
tory directly using the URLs of the credentials. 
Credentials are revoked by removing them from 
the repository. Relying parties (service providers) 
must periodically check the repository to see if a 
credential is still there or not, according to their 
own risk assessments. 
We have chosen to implement the second mode 
of operation because of its various advantages 
given in the fifth section. In our first version, we 
have used an LDAP server as the credential reposi-
tory, and in the second version we are adding an 
Apache WEBDAV server (Goland, Whitehead, 
Faizi, Carter, & Jensen, 1999).
delegation Policy enforcement
The most complex and crucial component in a 
DOA Web service is the PDP that can support 
the organisation’s delegation policy. The PDP 
essentially has two complementary functions to 
perform. 
• Firstly, it must validate a delegator’s claim 
to have the necessary set of attributes that 
it wishes to delegate and then validate if 
the chosen delegate has the necessary set 
of attributes to qualify as a delegate (this is 
the process of attribute or credential valida-
tion). 
• Secondly, it must determine if the delega-
tor is allowed to delegate these attributes to 
the chosen delegate (i.e., determine if the 
delegation request conforms to one of the 
delegation policy rules). 
XACML (OASIS-2, 2005) is an OASIS 
standard for an access control policy language 
in XML, and an open source implementation 
of an XACML PDP exists, written by Sun, and 
available from http://sunxacml.sourceforge.net/. 
XACML provides a rich language for specify-
ing who is allowed to do what. Access control 
subjects, resources, and actions are specified in 
terms of their attributes. If we make the delega-
tor the access control subject and the delegate 
the access control resource, while to delegate is 
the access control action of an XACML access 
control rule, then an XACML PDP can decide 
if a delegator with a given set of attributes is 
allowed to delegate some of these attributes to 
a potential delegate who possesses another set 
of attributes. This is the second of the functions 
described above. Consequently, an XACML PDP 
should work very well in the first mode of opera-
tion where the repository stores user attributes, 
and the attributes do not need to be validated 
(because their presence in the trusted repository 
is sufficient to say they are valid). 
However, XACML does not support creden-
tial validation, and therefore on its own cannot 
be used by either service providers that receive 
delegated credentials, or a DOA Web service 
that stores credentials instead of attributes. An 
XACML PDP works on the assumption that it is 
given a valid set of subject, resource, and action 
attributes upon which to make its access control 
decision. This can only work at a service provider 
site which directly trusts the issuers of all received 
credentials, so that there are no delegation chains 
to follow. An XACML PDP cannot determine if 
the credentials possessed by a delegated subject 
are valid or not. Consequently, an XACML 
implementation on its own is unable to enforce 
our delegation policy at the service provider site 
or in our DOA Web service that stores credentials, 
without significant enhancements, specifically the 
addition of a credential validation service (CVS). 
For this reason, we chose not to use an XACML 
PDP in our first implementation.
PERMIS (Chadwick & Otenko, 2003) is an-
other open source PDP implementation that sup-
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ports RBAC policies in XML. A PERMIS PDP 
comprises two components, a credential validation 
service (CVS) that validates users credentials, and 
a PDP that makes access control decisions. The 
PERMIS policy says who is entitled to assign 
which attributes to whom and whether delegation 
is allowed or not, as well as which attributes are 
needed to access which resources. Furthermore, 
PERMIS policies have an integer to control the 
depth of delegation. Thus, a PERMIS policy can 
be used to create an organisation’s delegation 
policy, as well as enforce it as a service provider’s 
site. PERMIS can be configured to either pull a 
user’s credentials from an external repository, 
or to have them presented by the PEP, and so is 
ideal for our delegation scenario where the user 
does not have to present his existing credentials 
in order to request the delegation of attributes 
to a delegate. The credential format primarily 
supported by PERMIS is the X.509 attribute 
certificate, and so this is the format we adopted 
for our delegated credentials. LDAP repositories 
support the storage and retrieval of X.509 attribute 
certificates, and so we chose to use LDAP as our 
credential repository. PERMIS also supports the 
no assertion flag and does not allow delegators to 
delegate attributes to themselves.
One of the limitations of PERMIS is that its 
delegation policy does not support the specifica-
tion of delegators and delegates by any of their 
attributes, but rather only by the naming domains 
of which they are members. Naming domains are 
specified using LDAP/X.500 distinguished names. 
This means that we cannot specify a delegation 
policy such as “heads of department can delegate 
the fire officer role to senior members of staff in 
their department.” Instead, we have to name the 
individual heads of department, and specify the 
naming domain that potential delegates reside in, 
for example, cn=John Smith,o=myorg,c=gb can 
delegate the fire officer role to principals who are 
from the naming domain “ou=deptA,o=myorg, 
c=gb.” This means our PERMIS delegation poli-
cies will be more restrictive or less efficient than 
ones we could write in the XACML language, 
but we are able to fully enforce them, while with 
XACML we can write richer delegation policies 
but we are not able to fully enforce them because 
XACML cannot validate (delegated) credentials. 
Consequently, in our first DOA Web services 
implementation we chose to use PERMIS on it 
own, but in the next implementation we plan to 
investigate the combination of the PERMIS CVS 
functionality with the XACML policy decision 
functionality.
client Access
Our implementation of the DOA Web service 
is written in Java, and runs inside a Tomcat ap-
plication server and Apache AXIS SOAP server. 
Consequently, it can be invoked through SOAP 
calls. The DOA Web service (actually the con-
taining Tomcat server) has its own X.509 public 
key certificate, and requires the requesting Web 
service to have one as well. These certificates 
are used to open a secure SSL (https) connec-
tion with the DOA Web service using mutual 
authentication. All other types of authentication 
method or connection are rejected. We chose to 
use SSL certificate-based mutual authentication 
rather than XML signed SOAP messages due to 
SSL’s superior performance and ubiquity. The SSL 
client must either be the entity directly making 
the request (i.e., the requestor), or a trusted proxy 
acting on its behalf. In the latter case the name of 
the requestor is taken from the first parameter of 
the Web services operation (except the storeAC-
forMe and revokeACforMe operations, which 
cannot come from a trusted proxy). The names of 
the trusted proxies are read in at initialisation time 
from a configuration file. We have implemented 
an Apache server as a trusted proxy, using LDAP 
username-password authentication of the users, 
and this will be described later.
The DOA Web service publishes a standard 
WSDL file that allows other Web services to 
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determine how to access its services. It supports 
five operations: 
• delegateForMe, whose arguments are: the 
distinguished name (DN) of the requestor 
(the delegator), the DN of the delegate, the 
attributes to be delegated, the validity time 
of the delegation (from and to), whether 
the delegated attributes can be asserted or 
not (yes/no), and how many more times the 
attributes can be delegated (the delegation 
depth, an integer). If the delegator is allowed 
to delegate this attribute to this delegate, an 
X.509 AC is created, with the DOA Web 
Service set as the credential issuer and the 
delegator’s name placed in the IssuedOnBe-
halfOf field. The latter is a standard X.509 
AC extension defined in the 2005 edition of 
X.509.
• revokeForMe, whose arguments are: the 
distinguished name (DN) of the requestor 
and the set of credentials that should be 
revoked. Each credential is identified by 
the DN of the holder, the DN of the issuer, 
and the serial number of the credential. This 
method allows the requestor to revoke many 
credentials at the same time (in one request). 
The DOA Web Service has built in rules for 
who is allowed to request the revocation of 
a credential. The allowed revokers are: the 
holder of the credential (i.e., the delegate 
himself), the issuer of the credential (which 
is usually the DOA Web Service but could 
be the delegator), who the credential was 
issued on behalf of (usually the delegator but 
could be blank), the source of authority of 
the delegation graph, or anyone who could 
have issued this credential. The rationale for 
allowing the latter category of revocation 
requestor was purely one of expediency. It 
was reasoned that if revocation was deemed 
to be necessary, then it should be able to be 
done fast by anyone in authority, in order 
to minimise the risk of damage from use 
of an unauthorised credential. If a user 
has the authority to issue a credential, and 
could have issued it, even though she did 
not actually issue it, then she should still 
be allowed to revoke it. While this does 
provide a minimal chance for a denial of 
service attack by a person in authority, the 
risk from this was deemed to be less than 
allowing a credential that should be revoked 
to remain in circulation longer than it should 
have been, say because the actual delegator 
was not available to revoke it.
• storeACforMe, whose argument is a fully 
formed digitally signed X.509 AC, sent as 
a base64 encoded string. This is a reposi-
tory service for an external user who has 
the ability to sign and issue credentials 
herself, but does not have write access to 
the credential repository. The requestor must 
be authenticated via SSL client authentica-
tion and have the same name as the issuer 
of the credential. The DOA Web Service 
checks if the issuer is allowed to delegate 
this credential according to the delegation 
policy, and if so, stores the credential in the 
delegate’s LDAP entry in the repository and 
reports success to the requestor. Otherwise, 
it reports unauthorised to the requestor and 
discards the credential.
• revokeACforMe, whose argument is the 
X.509 AC that is to be revoked, encoded as 
a base64 string. The DN of the requestor 
is taken from the client certificate of the 
established SSL connection and must be 
one of the allowed revokers, according to 
the rules presented in revokeForMe above; 
otherwise the revocation request is rejected. 
If the requestor is allowed to revoke the 
credential, then the AC is removed from the 
delegate’s LDAP entry.
• searchRepository, whose arguments are 
the DN of the requestor and the DN of the 
delegate. The authenticated SSL client must 
be the trusted proxy or the requestor. This 
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service searches through the repository for 
credentials issued to the delegate. The ser-
vice then checks if the requestor is authorised 
to view the retrieved credentials. This is 
determined from a configuration parameter, 
which can be set to either anyone or revokers. 
If anyone, all the retrieved credentials are 
returned, and there is no privacy protection 
on viewing a user’s credentials. If revok-
ers, each credential is checked to see if the 
requestor is allowed to revoke it, using the 
same rules as in revokeForMe above. The 
procedure removes from the result all those 
credentials that the requestor is not autho-
rised to revoke. In this way, the privacy of the 
delegate’s credentials is protected, because 
only those requestors who are authorised to 
revoke the credentials are allowed to search 
for them and retrieve them.
When Apache is acting as a trusted proxy on 
behalf of a human delegator, the human is pre-
sented with the Web page shown in Figure 7. In 
order to access this page, the user must first be au-
thenticated by Apache. Any type of authentication 
supported by or plugged into Apache can be used. 
We have chosen to use standard Apache LDAP 
authentication, using usernames and passwords 
stored in our organisation’s LDAP server, because 
this is the authentication mechanism used by all 
our users to access the university’s network and 
services. The displayed delegation page invites the 
user to search through the organisation’s LDAP 
service to find the user he wishes to delegate to, 
for example, be entering the surname. A pick-
ing list of users who match the entered criteria 
is displayed, and the user chooses the correct 
person. The user then selects the attributes that 
he wishes to delegate to this person, fills in the 
validity time of the delegation (from and to), and 
can then choose if the person should be allowed to 
further delegate these attributes or not. If further 
delegation is selected, the user can set the depth 
of further delegation and choose between allow-
ing or forbidding the user to assert the roles that 
have just been delegated to him. Finally, the user 
presses the Issue Attribute button and if everything 
is in accordance with the delegation policy, the 
delegation is allowed. If the user has tried to do 
something counter to the delegation policy, one 
of two things might happen, according to the 
downgradeable configuration parameter of the 
delegation service. If the infringement is minor, 
for example, setting the validity period too long, 
and downgradeable is true, the delegation is still 
allowed to go ahead but the user’s parameters are 
overridden by ones that conform to the policy. If 
downgradeable is false, or the infringement can-
not be downgraded, for example, the delegator is 
trying to delegate to someone not allowed by the 
policy, then the delegation is rejected.
The delegator (and all other allowed revokers) 
can revoke the issued credential at any time by 
entering the Revocation Service Web page. Again, 
the requestor must be authenticated by Apache 
before the revocation page is displayed. Upon 
entering the revocation page, the requestor is 
again invited to search through the organisation’s 
LDAP service to find the delegate he wishes 
to revoke an attribute from. After entering the 
search criteria, a list of users is displayed. Upon 
choosing one of them, the system invokes the 
searchRepository Web service and one of three 
responses will be displayed, either: a list of the 
user’s credentials that are visible to the requestor, 
or a message saying that this user does not have 
any attributes, or an error message saying that 
the requestor is not allowed to search and view 
this user’s attributes.
This DOA Web service has been piloted in 
various grid applications by the National e-Sci-
ence centre at the University of Glasgow, and 
details of these trials can be found in Sinnott, 
Stell, Chadwick, and Otenko (2005), Sinnott, 
Watt, Jiang, Stell, and Ajayi (2006), and Watt, 
Sinnott, Jiang, Ajayi, and Koetsier (2006).
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conclusIon And future 
trends
comparison with other Work
VOMS (Alfieri et al., 2005) is a Web services-
based credential issuing service, but it is not a 
delegation service. It only implements part of the 
model specified in the fifth section, specifically 
the Issue AC and repository services. A user can 
make repeated requests to a VOMS service, for 
it to issue short lived X.509 attribute certificates 
derived from a subset of the attributes held in the 
user’s repository entry. The user must be in pos-
session of an X.509 public key certificate (PKC) 
in order to utilise the VOMS service, because the 
holder field of the credential points to the public 
key certificate of the user (PKC issuer and serial 
number) rather than the distinguished name of the 
user. The repository holds the various attributes of 
the users, but these can only be inserted into the 
repository by the VO manager. Users are not able 
to delegate their attributes to other users. They 
must ask the VO manager to insert attributes into 
other user’s entries for them. The VOMS service 
therefore places a high administrative and main-
tenance load on the VO manager, because he is 
responsible for all delegations and revocations, 
and this task cannot be dynamically delegated 
to the VO users.
Signet (McRae, Nguyen, Cohen, & Vine, 
2004) and Grouper (see http://middleware.inter-
net2.edu/dir/groups/grouper/) from the Internet2 
consortium are developing software that will 
allow users to assign permissions and delegate 
privileges between each other. The system is ar-
chitecturally much simpler than the one depicted 
in Figure 3. It is designed for human users and is 
Web server rather than Web services based. The 
user interface is any standard Web browser, and 
the server functionality is written as Java servlets 
and jsp which can run in any container such as 
Tomcat. The repository is a RDBMS with SQL 
interface which stores a user’s group member-
ships (or roles) and individual permissions (for 
fine grained control) along with their validity 
times and other policy related information such 
as prerequisites before a privilege can be granted 
Figure 7. Web-based front end to our delegation service
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and conditions on its use after it has been granted. 
Consequently, there is no PDP holding the delega-
tion policy as a separate entity. Rather, the policy 
is distributed throughout the repository in the 
various tables. Signet does not issue credentials, 
and this functionality has to be provided by an 
external plugin that retrieves and packages the 
data from the repository in an appropriate way, 
for example, as a SAML assertion.
Work has been on going since 2004 in OA-
SIS to add support for delegation of authority to 
XACMLv2 (OASIS, 2007). This work is designed 
to allow the setting of access control policies 
to be delegated between administrators, and is 
complementary to the DOA work described here. 
Unfortunately, the DOA work in XACML has 
progressed rather more slowly than originally 
anticipated, and at the time of writing it is not 
clear what the outcome will be. In parallel with the 
OASIS work, we devised a mechanism whereby 
the PERMIS CVS could be incorporated with 
a XACMLv2 PDP at a service provider site, in 
order to provide valid attributes to the PDP from 
delegated credentials. The valid attributes can then 
be fed into the XACML PDP for it to make access 
control decisions. This work is described fully in 
Chadwick, Otenko, and Nguyen (2006).
future Work
We have developed a secure audit Web service 
(SAWS) which allows events to be securely audited 
in a tamperproof log (Xu, Chadwick, & Otenko, 
2005). We propose to incorporate this into a 
future version of the DOA Web service so that 
every delegation decision can be securely logged 
for future reference. This might be important, for 
example, when trying to retrospectively trace 
how a person became authorised, or when he was 
revoked and by whom. 
We are currently building a WEBDAV reposi-
tory to replace the existing LDAP repository, so 
that individual credentials can be uniquely identi-
fied by their URLs. A disadvantage of using LDAP 
repositories is that a URL can only usually refer 
to all the credentials of a particular user, rather 
than to individual credentials. This is because a 
set of ACs are usually all held together as a set of 
values within a single LDAP attributeCertificate 
attribute. This makes it impossible to retrieve a 
single credential of a user.
We are currently adding the ability to perform 
fine grained delegation based on individual per-
missions rather than attributes. As pointed out 
above, a number of complexities are introduced 
when this occurs in a multiple domain environ-
ment, due to the fact that a permission that is 
understood and valid in one domain may not be 
recognised in another domain. We are address-
ing this problem at the attribute level by adding 
role/attribute mappings to our service provider 
PDP policies. This will allow an attribute that is 
issued in one domain to be recognised in a service 
provider domain. Extending this mapping to per-
missions would allow fine grained authorisations 
to be understood between domains.
While oursystem currently only supports 
credentials in X.509 attribute certificate format, 
it will be relatively easy to add signed SAML 
attribute assertions as well due to the modular 
construction of PERMIS. Once the performance 
of signed SAML assertions improves, this addi-
tion will be made.
Finally, we are investigating how best to 
combine the PERMIS CVS functionality with the 
XACML policy decision functionality to allow 
richer delegation policies to be specified through 
the identification of delegators and delegates by 
their attributes rather than by their membership 
of a specific domain.
As a general trend, we expect to see more Web-
based interfaces being gradually introduced to 
allow users to delegate authority to other users, and 
more willingness on the side of administrations 
to empower users to delegate among themselves, 
providing they can specify adequate delegation 
policies to control this. We also expect to see 
users and Web services dynamically delegating 
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authority to subordinate Web services to do work 
on their behalf, so that work flows can be auto-
mated and distributed throughout and between 
organisations. We also expect to see much richer 
functionality to be gradually introduced into 
the Web front ends and the back end delegation 
policies. We have taken the first tentative steps 
along this path, by allowing dynamic delegation 
of authority between users and Web services, and 
we fully expect more sophisticated and richer 
mechanisms to follow.
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